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NON-RELIANCE CLAUSES AND SEC




In merger and acquisition discussions, the purchase of a target cor-
poration is the most significant transaction in that corporation's exis-
tence. The acquiring corporation's directors and managers are under
tremendous pressure from their shareholders to increase shareholder
market value.' Corporate combinations offer directors and managers
the possibility of increasing shareholder market value through syner-
gies.2 During acquisition negotiations, the purchaser wants access to
all potentially relevant documents. Different people, most of whom
are lower-level employees or outsiders, not authoritative representa-
tives of the seller, draft the documents. If the purchaser has a ques-
tion, the seller may answer, but often the seller does not want to be
bound for the accuracy of these documents except to the extent that
the seller expressly says so.
Feeling the immense pressure from shareholders, directors and
managers often rush into transactions, overpaying to their
I Shareholder market value is the market value of the firm's outstanding common stock:
market price x number of shares outstanding. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 253 (2d ed. 1995).
2 There are numerous motives for acquisitions, but:
Synergies of various sorts - operating, financial, or managerial - are the most
common explanation offered by the acquirer's managers for an acquisition....
... Operating synergy involves the prospect of improvements in the productive ac-
tivities of the two companies .... Financial synergy concerns the potential value of
reducing the variance of a company's earning by diversifying at the firm level, or re-
placing the external capital market with an internal market.
Id. at 258.
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shareholders' detriment.3  Once the purchaser realizes the
overpayment, it may try to recover its loss by claiming that the seller
misrepresented material facts. Even if underpayment occurs, the
purchaser may still decide to seek return of part of the purchase
price-an attempt to renegotiate an even better price after the fact. In
these situations, the seller has a legitimate concern that the purchaser
will claim reliance on a document that the seller never represented to
be accurate.
A non-reliance clause (NRC) included in the final agreement is
designed to avoid this threat by defining the boundaries of the
transaction. An NRC provides that the purchaser is "relying solely on
representations contained in the final written contract, thereby
eliminating the possibility that an aggrieved party may plausibly
claim reliance on any oral or written representations that are excluded
from the final contract.' 4 NRCs permit purchasers to rely on, and
therefore sue under, only a specific list of representations and
warranties contained in the final agreement.
Allowing parties to completely contract out of securities regulation
by private agreement would facilitate fraud. To prevent this, sec-
tion 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that "[a]ny
condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive com-
pliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be
void."5 The underlying concern of section 29(a) is "whether the
agreement 'weakens [the] ability to recover under the Exchange
Act.' 6 Parties persistently push the limits of section 29(a). Courts
must rule if NRCs: waive compliance of the 1934 Act; limit and de-
fine the boundaries of the transaction; 7 or neither.8
In Harsco Corp. v. Segui,9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit determined that an NRC did not "constitute a forbidden
3 The two most cited reasons for overpayment are (1) optimism: managers successful in
one business may be apt to overestimate their ability to run another business; and (2) Winner's
Curse: in an auction, the person who overbids (overpays) wins. See id. at 295-97; Bernard
Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 624-27 (1989).
4 David K. Lutz, Note, The Law and Economics of Securities Fraud: Section 29(A) and
the Non-Reliance Clause, 79 CHI.-KENT L. Rev. 803, 804 (2004).
5 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2000).
6 Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) (quoting Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
7 Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1996).
8 If an NRC says, "Buyer agrees not to sue over any representation other than" X, then it
is an attempted contractual modification (or limitation). If, however, an NRC says, "Buyer states
that it has not relied on any representation other than" X, then it is a statement of fact.
9 91 F.3d 337.
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waiver of compliance."' 0 The NRC simply "define[d] the boundaries
of the transaction."' 1 In 2003, however, the Third Circuit held in AES
Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.12 that enforcement of an NRC in a stock
purchase agreement "to bar AES's fraud claims as a matter of law
would be inconsistent with Section 29(a).' 3 The court held that a
purchaser anticipatorily waives future claims based on fraudulent
misrepresentations if the purchaser agrees never to claim reliance on
representations not included in the final agreement. 14 The Third Cir-
cuit rejected the holding in Harsco Corp., thereby creating a circuit
split. 15
This Note will examine the "reasonable reliance" element of Rule
lOb-5 in the context of corporate transactions between sophisticated
parties.' 6 It will show that an NRC serves to avoid unwarranted Rule
lOb-5 claims in connection with stock purchase acquisitions. This
Note will argue that the Second Circuit was correct when it held that
an NRC does not waive compliance of the 1934 Act; rather, an NRC
defines the boundaries of the transaction. 17 An NRC is not a waiver
but a statement of fact. NRCs do not bar plaintiffs from suing over
false statements of material facts, but merely represent that the plain-
tiff has not relied on certain statements.
Part I of this Note will provide a background and historical per-
spective on the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the 1934 Act. It
will also discuss the requirements of scienter and reasonable reliance
for Rule lOb-5 claims. Part II will argue that an NRC does not
"weaken" a plaintiffs ability to recover under the Act; it simply nar-
rows the scope of a seller's potential liability to a contractually agreed
level. Part II will also analyze the circuit split concerning the effect of
NRCs in federal securities fraud actions. Part III will argue that an
NRC should establish a sophisticated party's non-reliance on repre-
sentations and warranties not contained in the final agreement.
10 Id. at 343.
i Id.
12 AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cit. 2003).
13 Id. at 180.
14 Id. at 180-81.
15 Lutz, supra note 4, at 805.
16 See discussion infra Part I.A.
17 Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1996).
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I. SECURITIES FRAUD UNDER RULE 1OB-5
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts to restore investor con-
fidence and alleviate the mistrust created by the American stock mar-
ket crash of 1929.18 The 1933 Act is designed to "provide investors
with full disclosure of material information concerning public offer-
ings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and,
through the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical
standards of honesty and fair dealing." 19 The 1933 Act's principal
objective is to promote full disclosure in securities offerings.
The 1934 Act is "intended principally to protect investors against
manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon
securities exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose
regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on
national securities exchanges. 2 ° Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes
it illegal for any person to employ deceptive or manipulative devices
in the purchase or sale of marketable securities. 21 Both Acts recognize
the need for public investment in the securities markets in order to
increase employment and encourage economic growth and capital
formation.22 The 1934 Act granted the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) regulatory and enforcement authority. 23 With this
authority, the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national secu-
rities exchange,
18 See Eugene P. Caiola, Retroactive Legislative History: Scienter Under the Uniform Se-
curity Litigations Standards Act of 1998, 64 ALB. L. REV. 309, 311 (2000) ("The Securities
Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 were written in response to the mistrust of the securities mar-
kets occasioned by the collapse of the stock market in 1929."); Michael P. Catina & Cindy M.
Schmitt, Private Securities Litigation: The Need for Reform, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 295, 299 (1998) (discussing how Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts "to
promote investor confidence and regulate the American stock market after the crash of 1929").
19 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
20 Id.
21 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 780) (2000); see also William S.
Feinstein, Securities Fraud: Pleading Securities Fraud with Particularity--Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b) in the Rule lOb-5 Context: Kowal v. MCI Communications Corporation,
63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 851, 853 (1996) (stating that it is "unlawful to use deceptive or ma-
nipulative practices in the purchase or sale of marketable securities").
22 Catina & Schmitt, supra note 18, at 299.
23 Id. at 300.
[Vol. 56:41122
NON-RELIANCE CLAUSES & SEC RULE lOb-5
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of any security.24
The Supreme Court repeatedly "describe[s] the 'fundamental pur-
pose' of the [1934] Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclo-
sure.' 25 Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 reach a plethora of schemes
aimed at defrauding investors.26 This may have a "chilling effect" on
companies, because they fear penalization in connection with stock
purchase acquisitions.27 To soften this effect, "both the judiciary and
the legislature have begun to narrow the scope of section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5" in hopes of preventing "frivolous litigation or unfair re-
sults. '' 28 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,29 for example,
the Supreme Court observed that, "[w]hen we deal with private ac-
tions under Rule 1Ob-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn,' 30 and is "badly in need of
pruning because of the potential overbreadth of its language., 31 The
Supreme Court has subsequently "construed these provisions with
more skepticism and has limited much of Rule 1Ob-5's potency., 32
24 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2005).
25 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977); see also Brendan J. McCarthy,
Note, "In Connection with ": The Need for Limitation to SEC Rule lOb-5 in Dissemination of
Misleading Information Cases, 54 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1347, 1350 (2004) ("Although protec-
tion of investors is of the utmost concern under the securities laws, [Rule] 1Ob-5 need not be so
far reaching as to capture conduct that has a tangential connection to a securities transaction.");
Bhavik R. Patel, Note, Securities Regulation-Fraud-Rule lOb-5 No Longer Scares the Judici-
ary, but May Scare Corporate Defendants: The United States Supreme Court Switches Direc-
tions. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001), 25 U. ARK.
LrITLE ROCK L. REv. 191,197 (2002).
26 Patel, supra note 25, at 200.
27 Stock purchase acquisitions include both issuer repurchases and tender offer mergers.
28 Patel, supra note 25, at 200.
29 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
30 Id. at 737 (emphasis added).
31 Patel, supra note 25, at 200; see also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737 (stating that
Congress did not intend the "present state of the law").
32 Patel, supra note 25, at 201.
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In a Rule lOb-5 claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant know-
ingly or recklessly 33 misrepresented or omitted a material fact 34 "in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security' '35 and the omit-
ted fact, or reasonable reliance36 on defendant's misrepresentation,
caused the plaintiff s injury.37
But, "[n]ot all misrepresentations... are actionable. 38 Courts dis-
tinguish "generally optimistic statements," considered "puffery" and
immaterial as a matter of law, from specific statements, which can be
actionable. 39 To plead an actionable misrepresentation a plaintiff must
show that the misrepresented information is material.4n
An NRC is irrelevant to omissions. In corporate transactions, the
seller will always have unique or superior knowledge about its busi-
ness.4 1 This information will not be readily available to the purchaser
if the seller does not disclose it.42 Specific reliance is impossible un-
der these circumstances. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,4 3
33 The United States Supreme Court held, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), that scienter is required, but there are subsequent federal circuit court cases supporting
the notion that a finding of recklessness will suffice to prove a violation of Rule lOb-5. See
discussion infra Part I.B.2.
34 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2005); Joseph Conahan et al., Securities Fraud, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2003); see also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450
(1976) (stating that materiality "requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable
shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to
him"); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (adopting the TSC Industries standard
for materiality in cases brought under Rule 10b-5); Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (holding that substantive fraud is an essential element of a Rule lOb-5 proceeding).
35 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997)
(requiring fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" as an element of a
Rule lOb-5 action); McCarthy, supra note 25, at 1348 (noting that because fraud is a necessary
element of a I Ob-5 claim the plaintiff must prove the common law elements of fraud, "scienter,
materiality, reliance, causation, and damages").
36 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 179
(3d Cir. 2003) (stating that "[flederal law calls for the determination of reasonableness to be
made on a case-by-case basis based on all of the surrounding circumstances"); Harsco Corp. v.
Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring reliance as a necessary element of a Rule lOb-
5 action).
37 AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 178 (quoting Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 174
(3d Cir. 2000)); Conahan et al., supra note 34, at 1044.
38 Feinstein, supra note 21, at 855; see also TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448 (discussing omis-
sions based upon the "materiality" of the fact).
39 Conahan et al., supra note 34, at 1048. See generally Jennifer O'Hare, The Resurrection
of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud
Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1707-15 (1998) (describing various situations in which courts
have recognized the puffery defense).
40 A fact is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC
Indus., 426 U.S. at 449).
41 Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual Negotia-
tions, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 70, 195 (1993).
42 Id.
43 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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the Supreme Court articulated a presumption of reliance in nondisclo-
sure Rule lOb-5 cases, stating that "positive proof of reliance is not a
prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld
be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might have consid-
ered them important in the making of this decision." 44 A plaintiff
must show the information is material and the defendant had a duty to
disclose the information-a "duty to speak. ''45 However, Affiliated
Ute's presumption of reliance is rebuttable, 46 and "must be confined
to making proof of specific reliance on particular omissions unneces-
sary when the circumstances indicate that the plaintiff placed some
general reliance upon the defendant's disclosing material informa-
tion. '47 The presumption is "essentially a rule of judicial economy
and convenience designed to avoid the impracticality of requiring that
each plaintiff shareholder testify concerning the reliance element.
'48
A plaintiff can falsely allege an oral misrepresentation by the
defendant, but -it is much harder to falsely allege nondisclosure.
Although, "positive proof of reliance is not required for recovery in a
nondisclosure case, if the defendant is able to prove that there clearly
was no reliance, nondisclosure cannot be said to be the cause of
subsequent loss."49 As long as the seller provides all disclosures in
writing, it can produce these writings to rebut false omissions claims.
But, what if the defendant hides materials during the plaintiffs due
diligence50 investigation and then produces these documents to refute
the omissions claim? Should the allegation that the defendant hid
materials be barred by an NRC? No. If the plaintiff proves the
allegation, the court should resolve the claim as an omission and the
plaintiff will have the presumption of reliance. If the defendant
refutes the claim by proving disclosure, the NRC becomes relevant to
determine the reasonableness of the plaintiff's reliance on the alleged
misrepresentations. Since specific reliance is not required in claims
predicated on omissions, an NRC does not bar such claims.
Id. at 153-54, cited with approval in Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209, 213
(6th Cir. 1984).
45 For a misrepresentation, the plaintiff must only prove the information is material. Fein-
stein, supra note 21, at 855-56 ("A duty to speak may arise from other federal securities laws,
such as ... registration of publicly offered securities ... [or] inclusion of certain information in
prospectuses. A duty to speak may also arise where the failure to update previously released
information would cause the public to be misled by such inaccurate disclosures.").
46 Biechele, 747 F.2d at 214.
47 Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 622 (5th Cir. 1974).
48 Biechele, 747 F.2d at 214 (quoting Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 284
(7th Cir. 1981)).
49 Id. at 214-15.
50 Due diligence is an investigation or audit of the target corporation. During due dili-
gence, purchasers attempt to confirm all material facts relating to the transaction.
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B. Required State of Mind: Scienter: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelde t
and Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.52
A plaintiff must "prove requisite intent in order to establish a vio-
lation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 53 A plaintiff must show the
defendant acted with scienter.54 Scienter" is the "central question in
many garden variety fraud cases. 56 To resolve this issue, courts must
inquire into the defendant's state of mind, which is often a compli-
cated task.57 Courts must infer the defendant's state of mind from its
conduct.58 The basis "of such inferences has proven to be, at best, an
inexact science. 59
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) requires
plaintiffs to provide "a short and plain statement of the claim."6
FRCP Rule 9(b) departs from Rule 8(a), requiring that "[ijn all aver-
ments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge,
and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 61
In 1995, however, Congress adopted the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) 62 to discourage frivolous claims.63 The
PLSRA adopted a heightened pleading standard requiring that:
In any private action arising under this title in which the
plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the
51 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
52 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
53 Conahan et al., supra note 34, at 1049.
54 E.g., Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
55 Scienter, Latin for "knowingly," is defined as:
1. A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the conse-
quences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act's having been done know-
ingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment .... 2. A mental
state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In this sense, the term
is used most often in the context of securities fraud. The Supreme Court has held that
to establish a claim for damages under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant acted with scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 S.Ct.
1375 (1976).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004).
56 Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions Under Sec-




60 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
61 FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).
62 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1995)).
63 A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Mo-
tions To Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPtRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 125, 127 (2005).
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defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint
shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate
this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.64
The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to plead scienter with particularity,
but "it remains unclear how much detail is required to meet that par-
ticularity standard. 65 NRCs serve the purpose of avoiding litigation,
which is always expensive and unpredictable, especially when the
central issue is the defendant's state of mind.
1. Scienter Defined: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, defendant Ernst & Ernst was a Big
Eight accounting firm retained by First Securities Company of Chi-
cago, a small brokerage firm, to perform audits. 66 Plaintiffs, custom-
ers of First Securities, invested in a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by
Leston B. Nay, president of First Securities with 92% ownership. 67
Nay carried on massive fraud for years by inducing the plaintiffs to
invest their funds in "escrow" accounts. Nay converted these funds to
68his own use. The plaintiffs sued First Securities and also Ernst &
Ernst for "aid[ing] and abett[ing]" Nay's Rule 1Ob-5 violations. 69 The
plaintiffs premised their suit against Ernst & Ernst on the accounting
firm's "'failure' to conduct proper audits of First Securities., 70 The
essence of their claim was that Ernst & Ernst failed to uncover the
fraud even though there were a number of clues to the fraud, such as
Nay's insisting on being the only one to open certain kinds of mail.'
The plaintiffs, however, failed to suggest that Ernst & Ernst intended
to defraud or mislead anyone relying on the audit.72
The Supreme Court "decisively resolved two issues for a Rule
lOb-5 violation: negligence is not sufficient, and scienter is re-
64 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 21D(b)(2), 109
Stat. 737, 747 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (1995)).
65 Pritchard & Sale, supra note 63, at 131.
66 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188 (1976).
67 Id. at 189.
6 Id.
69 Id. at 190.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. ("[Plaintiffs] specifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or intentional misconduct
on the part of Ernst & Ernst."). In their response to interrogatories plaintiffs "conceded that they
did 'not accuse Ernst & Ernst of deliberate, intentional fraud,' but merely with 'inexcusable
negligence."' Id. at 190 n.5.
20061 1127
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quired. ' '73 The Court defined scienter as "a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 74 The Hochfelder defini-
tion, sometimes considered narrow and stringent,75 effectively deals
with at least three different situations. First, it covers situations where
a defendant misstates a material fact while knowing the statement is
false. Second, if a defendant represents a material fact without any
belief as to whether it is true, the defendant acted with scienter. Third,
any false statement of knowledge by the speaker-i.e., the speaker
states he knows a fact is true when the fact is uncertain--defrauds
listeners to the extent of his knowledge thereby constituting scienter.
What the Hochfelder definition does not resolve is whether a showing
of recklessness satisfies scienter for the purposes of Rule lOb-5.76
2. Recklessness: Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.77
The Hochfelder Court stated that "[i]n certain areas of the law
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for pur-
poses of imposing liability for some act., 78 Many federal courts of
appeals hold that recklessness satisfies scienter in Rule lOb-5 viola-
tions,79 and adopt either the Seventh Circuit's definition of reckless-
ness from Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.,80 or a slight
variation thereof.8
1
73 William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal Se-
curities Laws, 34 HoUs. L. REV. 121, 145 (1997); see also Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201 ("[Sec-
tion) 10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read
to impose liability for negligent conduct alone.").
74 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
75 See Johnson, supra note 56, at 673 ("The narrow definition of scienter, combined with
the suggestion that reckless behavior might only be sufficient to establish liability under certain
circumstances, suggests that Hochfelder's scienter requirement is stringent.").
76 See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (refusing to address whether reckless behavior is
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b)).
77 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977).
78 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
79 See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (9th Cir. 1990); Van
Dyke v. Cobum Enter., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989); Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d
1004, 1010 (1lth Cir. 1985); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982); Sharp
v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642
F.2d 929, 961 (5th Cir. 1981); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th
Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at 1044.
80 See Janas v. McCracken, 183 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Sundstrand
Corp. standard for recklessness); Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1118 (same).
81 See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d at 961-62 (using the Sundstrand Corp.
definition of recklessness to define "severe recklessness").
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In Sundstrand, plaintiff, Sundstrand Corporation sued defendant,
Standard Kollsman Industries (SKI).82 Henry W. Meers, a director of
SKI, allegedly misrepresented the financial status of SKI. Sundstrand
claimed it relied on Meers' misrepresentations to purchase the shares
of SKI. Later, the SKI shares became worthless.8 3
The Seventh Circuit defined recklessness for the purposes of fed-
eral securities fraud violations as:
[C]onduct [that] may be defined as a highly unreasonable
omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading
buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.84
Under the Sundstrand definition, "the risk of misleading buyers 'must
be actually known' or sufficiently obvious that the reasonable man
would know of it, and 'the omission must derive from something
more egregious than even 'white heart/empty head' good faith."'
85
This is consistent with congressional goals. In Rule lOb-5 claims,
courts must focus on the challenged conduct's danger to innocent
investors, rather than other tangential concerns, such as the fairness of
the bargain. Allowing recklessness to satisfy scienter permits plain-
tiffs to bring federal securities fraud actions against all parties guilty
of "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care." 8 This
is within the original intent of Congress.
87
C. Reasonable Reliance
Courts have not established a bright line rule for determining rea-
sonable reliance as a matter of law. Instead, courts look to a number
of factors: plaintiff's expertise and sophistication in financial and
security matters; the existence of a long-standing business or personal
relationship; plaintiffs access to relevant information; the existence
of a fiduciary relationship; defendant's concealment of the fraud;
82 SKI merged with and into Sun Chemical Corporation at the close of 1972 so the
amended complaint named Sun Chemical rather than SKI as defendant. Sundstrand Corp., 553
F.2d at 1036 n.1.
83 Johnson, supra note 56, at 689 (noting that Meers was also managing partner of an un-
derwriter trying to promote the merger and that the merger fell apart when Meers's misrepresen-
tations came to light).
84 Sundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth.,
428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
85 Caiola, supra note 18, at 314.
86 Sundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Franke, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 725).
87 See discussion supra Part LA.
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plaintiff's opportunity to detect fraud; whether the plaintiff initiated
or sought to expedite the stock transaction: and the specificity or gen-
erality of the misrepresentations.88
This balancing test creates tremendous "uncertainty in contractual
dealings and forces the parties to encounter litigation on the other end
of the deal ... by requiring an ex ante balancing and individual de-
termination of the factors listed above., 89 This significantly increases
transaction costs and inefficient outcomes. 90 Parties often try to con-
tract out of this uncertainty by private agreement. NRCs obviate bal-
ancing and lower transaction costs by "determin[ing], by agreement,
the rule governing the judicial interpretation of the contract." 9'
Reckless conduct cannot satisfy reasonable reliance;92 rather, a
plaintiff must exercise the "appropriate diligence or due care ' 93 that a
"reasonable person would have exercised to protect his own inter-
ests. 94 This protects potential defendants by requiring plaintiffs to
conduct a reasonable investigation prior to purchasing or selling secu-
rities, and furthers both the PSLRA's and FRCP's efforts to limit
vexatious litigation by requiring actual substance to plaintiffs' claims.
Courts question reasonable reliance in at least two situations. 95 The
first is when the "plaintiff relied on oral or written representations that
are contradicted by the offering memorandum or prospectus. 96 The
second is when the "plaintiff relied on oral or written misrepresenta-
tions.., that were not included in the final written agreement, and the
contract contained an NRC., 97 The second situation exists because the
parties want to limit the seller's representations to the "four corners"
of the final contract by including an NRC.98 The goal of the clause is
to preclude "an aggrieved party from claiming reliance on any repre-
sentations that are not included" in the final written agreement. 99
88 Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Zobrist v. Coal-
X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1983)).
89 Lutz, supra note 4, at 810.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Kennedy, 814 F.2d at 805.
93 Straub v. Vaisman Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 1976) (describing policy considera-
tions behind requiring a limited duty of diligence from lOb-5 plaintiffs).
94 Lutz, supra note 4, at 808.
95 Id.
96 Id.; see also Kennedy, 814 F.2d at 801 (affirming summary judgment against plaintiffs
who claimed to have relied on broker's employee's misrepresentations despite contradictory
language in offering memorandum); Zobrist v. Coal-X, 708 F.2d 1511, 1514 (10th Cir. 1983)
(holding that a purchaser's reliance on oral representations was unjustified when offering
memorandum contradicted them).
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Courts generally hold that cases in the first situation are not, as a
matter of law, sustainable under Rule lOb-5 because reliance cannot
be reasonable. 100 The second situation-when a plaintiff relies "on
oral or written misrepresentations... not included in the final written
agreement"°01-- created a circuit split.
102
II. NON-RELIANCE CLAUSES AND SIMILAR CONTRACTUAL
PROVISIONS: THE CASE LAW
An NRC raises two major issues. First, does an NRC prevent a
Rule 1Ob-5 claim, or is it merely a factor in determining whether the
plaintiff's reliance was reasonable?10 3 Second, does an NRC violate
section 29(a) by limiting or weakening the plaintiff's ability to re-
cover? 1°4 An NRC's effect varies among federal courts of appeals. 105
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Section 29(a)
The Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMa-
hon1°6 "opined that section 29(a) only proscribes waiver of the Ex-
change Act's substantive obligations."'10 7 This includes reasonable
reliance. Section 29(a) is primarily concerned with whether a stipula-
tion in an agreement, voluntary or not, "waive[s] compliance with [a]
provision" of the 1934 Act. 10 8 The Court added that, "[slection 29(a)
is concerned, not with whether brokers 'maneuver[ed customers] into'
100 1n Kennedy, 814 F.2d at 798, defendant told the plaintiffs the investment was safe but
the memorandum disclosed the high degree of risk involved with the transaction. The plaintiffs
executed documents acknowledging the risks and were barred from a Rule l0b-5 action because
there was no reasonable reliance. In Zobrist, 708 F.2d at 1511, defendant told plaintiffs the
investment was a "sure thing," but the memorandum disclosed the high degree of risk involved
with the transaction. Plaintiffs were barred from a Rule lOb-5 action because reasonable reli-
ance could not be established. See Lutz, supra note 4, at 808-09 (providing a brief discussion of
both Kennedy and Zobrist).
101 Lutz, supra note 4, at 808.
102 Compare AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding an NRC
invalid and a violation of Section 29(A)), with Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding an NRC valid and therefore barring suit under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
103 Lutz, supra note 4, at 810.
1041d.
105 See Mark Betzen & Richard Meamber, Rule lOb-5 and Related Considerations in Ac-
quisition Agreements, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Aug. 2004, at 10, available at
http://metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2004/August/l0.pdf (describing the circuit split discussed
infra Part ll.B).
1- 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
107 Marc L Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: A Decade After McMahon: Better for Inves-
tors than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1503, 1508 (1996); see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at
228 ("By its terms, § 29(a) only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations imposed by the
Exchange Act.").
10 5McMahon, 482 U.S. at 230 (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78cc (2000)).
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an agreement, but ... whether the agreement 'weaken[s] their ability
to recover under the [Exchange] Act. '' °9
An NRC does not "weaken" a plaintiff's ability to recover under
the Act; it simply limits a defendant's liability to a negotiated level.
Parties make numerous representations during negotiations of acquisi-
tions. A purchaser may not always express the importance of a repre-
sentation. After the parties execute the agreement containing an NRC,
if the purchaser realizes the seller has omitted a material fact relied
upon, the purchaser may not have a Rule lOb-5 claim. The seller
could argue that the NRC waives possible Rule lOb-5 claims, but the
purchaser can easily avoid this fate by reading the final agreement
and either refusing to sign the NRC or by not relying on the excluded
documents. If a statement is material, the purchaser can insist that the
statement be included in the agreement. Moreover, in corporate trans-
actions, the parties are sophisticated, represented by counsel, and
have the opportunity to negotiate representations and warranties.110
The purchaser can still challenge the validity of the NRC under tradi-
tional contract theory, specifically unconscionability. 1
B. Section 29(a): Circuit Split
In 1966, the First Circuit, in Rogen v. Ilikon Corp.,12 reversed the
trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants and held
that a contractual provision similar to an NRC did not waive compli-
19 Id. (first alteration added) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953), overruled
by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).110Amanda K. Esquibel, The Finality of Buyout Agreements in the Close Corporation
Context: What Recourse Remains for Aggrieved Sellers?, 53 RuTGERS L. REv. 865, 899 (2001).
111 An aggrieved purchaser may be able to prevail under contract and the doctrine of un-
conscionability by providing specific evidence to a court for its determination. Unconscionabil-
ity is defined as:
1. Extreme unfairness.... 2. The principle that a court may refuse to enforce a con-
tract that is unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses during contract forma-
tion or because of overreaching contractual terms, esp. terms that are unreasonably
favorable to one party while precluding meaningful choice for the other party.
procedural unconscionability. Unconscionability resulting from improprieties in
contract formation (such as oral misrepresentations or disparities in bargaining posi-
tion) rather than from the terms of the contract itself.
substantive unconscionability. Unconscionability resulting from actual contract
terms that are unduly harsh, commercially unreasonable, and grossly unfair given the
existing circumstances.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supra note 55, at 1560-61 (citations omitted).
112361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966).
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ance with section 29(a). ll3 Upon further analysis, however, the court
concluded that the fundamental effect was the same and if the court
were to "hold that the existence of th[e] provision constituted the ba-
sis (or a substantial part of the basis) for finding non-reliance as a
matter of law, [the court] would have gone far toward eviscerating
Section 29(a)." 14 The court saw "no fundamental difference between
saying... 'I waive any rights I might have because of your represen-
tations or obligations to make full disclosure' and 'I am not relying on
your representations or obligations to make full disclosure.""' 15
Then in 1996, the Second Circuit held in Harsco Corp. v. Segui
that an NRC is not a forbidden waiver of compliance." t6 The agree-
ment was valid and enforceable to insulate the seller from liability.
Following Harsco Corp., federal circuits agreed with its reasoning
until the Third Circuit, in AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., ruled such
a clause invalid under section 29(a). 117 To date, the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari to resolve the issue."l
8
1. NRC Valid: Second Circuit: Harsco Corp. v. Segui
Thirty years after the Rogen court held that an NRC provision is
void because otherwise it would eviscerate section 29(a)," 9 the Har-
sco Corp. court distinguished its facts to reach a different conclusion.
In Harsco Corp., plaintiff Harsco Corporation purchased MultiServ.
In the purchase agreement (Agreement), MultiServ made express
representations, and Harsco expressly waived reliance on any outside
representations. Harsco later sued various former officers and share-
holders of MultiServ for alleged violations of Rule 10b-5. Harsco
claimed Multiserv made several misstatements during due diligence
regarding projected developments and business activities.
The Agreement between Harsco and MultiServ was sixty-plus,
single-spaced pages.120 Section 2.04 of the Agreement contained
MultiServ's "Representations and Warranties."' 121 Section 2.05
1 3 Id. at 268-69. But see Jackvony v. RIT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411, 417 (1st Cir. 1989)
(diverging from the Rogen court's reasoning and holding that the plaintiff could not establish
reasonable reliance when the alleged misrepresentations were not in the final written agree-
ment).
1 4 Jackvony, 873 F.2d at 417.
15 Id. (footnote omitted).
11691 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1996).
17AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003).
18 See id., cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1068 (2003).
19 Rogen v. flikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 1966).
120Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 340.
121 Harsco's complaint only cited section 2.04 of the Agreement but nowhere in the com-
plaint did Harsco draw the court's or MultiServ's attention to any specific portion or passage of
section 2.04. Section 2.04 was fourteen single-spaced pages, consisting of seventeen subsections
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specifically disclaimed any representations not in the Agreement. It
provided that MultiServ:
[S]hall not be deemed to have made to [Harsco] any
representation or warranty other than as expressly made by
[MultiServ] in Sections 2.01 through 2.04 hereof ....
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, and
notwithstanding any otherwise express representations and
warranties made by [MultiServ] in Sections 2.01 through 2.04
hereof . . , [MultiServ] make[s] no representation or
warranty to Purchaser with respect to:
(a) any projections, estimates or budgets heretofore
delivered to or made available to [Harsco] of future
revenues, expenses or expenditures, future results of
operations, [etc.]; or
(b) any other information or documents made avail-
able to [Harsco] or its counsel, accountants, or advi-
sors with respect to [MultiServ], except as expressly
covered by a representations and warranty contained
in Sections 2.01 through 2.04 hereof.
122
Along with the NRC, the Agreement contained a standard merger
clause, providing that the Agreement, "contain[ed] the entire agree-
ment between the parties hereto with respect to the transactions con-
templated by this Agreement and supersedes all prior arrangements or
understandings with respect thereto."1 23 The Agreement granted Har-
sco fourteen days to conduct "confirmatory due diligence."' 24 If dur-
ing this period Harsco learned that any of MultiServ' s representations
and numerous sub-paragraphs, containing numerous topics relating to MultiServ's representa-
tions. MultiServ's representations included the capitalization of MultiServ, MultiServ's finan-
cial statements, MultiServ's liabilities, the ownership and condition of MultiServ's assets,
MultiServ's litigation exposure, taxes, contracts, and environmental matters. Id.
122 Id. at 342-43 (last alteration in original).
123 Id. at 343 (referring to section 7.02 of the Agreement).
124 Section 1.04 of the Agreement explained the "confirmatory due diligence":
[Plurchaser and its accountants, consultants and advisers shall be permitted ... to re-
view the premises, facilities, books and records and Contracts of [MultiServ], and to
conduct interviews with Senior MultiServ Officers ... regarding the business, opera-
tions, financial condition and results of operations of [MultiServ], for the purpose of
confirming the accuracy of the representations and warranties of the [sellers] con-
tained in Article II hereof.
Id. at 340-41 (alteration in original).
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were false, Harsco could terminate the deal without penalty. 125 After
finishing due diligence, Harsco completed its purchase of MultiServ,
paying cash totaling $216 million and assuming approximately
$164 million in MultiServ debt. I2 6
The court rejected Harsco's arguments that sections 2.05 and 7.02
contravened section 29(a) of the 1934 Act.127 The court focused on
whether Harsco's Rule lOb-5 claim was so weakened by the NRC and
merger clause that section 29(a) prohibited it.128  The court
acknowledged that "[t]here can be no question that the Agreement
'weakens' Harsco's ability to recover under the Act," since the
Agreement "outlines, with great specificity, the representations and
warranties that Harsco agreed to rely upon-and not rely upon-in
purchasing all of MultiServ's outstanding stock."'' 2 9 However, "in the
circumstances of this case such a 'weakening' does not constitute a
forbidden waiver of compliance."'' 30 The Second Circuit stressed that
"there [was] a detailed writing developed via negotiations among
sophisticated business entities and their advisors. That
writing... defines the boundaries of the transaction. Harsco brings
this suit principally alleging conduct that falls outside those
boundaries."'' The court essentially held that, with no lack of
bargaining power, Harsco purchased fourteen pages of MultiServ's
representations and did not waive Rule lOb-5 claims but simply
limited its claims to the representations in the Agreement. 32
The Second Circuit limited its holding by stating that the "analysis
becomes a question of degree and context .... In different circum-
stances (e.g., if there were but one vague seller's representation) a 'no
other representations' clause might be toothless and run afoul of §
29(a). But not here."' 133
125 Id. at 341.
126Id.
127 Id. at 343.
128 Memorandum from Tashlik, Kreutzer, Goldwyn & Crandell P.C., Securities Fraud
Claims in Stock Purchase Transactions (Aug. 19, 2003), http://www.tkgclaw.com/maugl9.html.
129Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 343.
130 Id.; see also Lutz, supra note 4, at 812 ('"he clause at issue in Harsco is a more typical
use of an NRC than the contract addressed in Rogen, because the Harsco contract contained
specific representations on which the buyer was entitled to rely while not disclaiming disclosure
obligations, while the Rogen contract disclaimed any obligation to disclose and contained no
representations on which the purchaser was entitled to rely.") (citations omitted).
131 Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 343; see also Lutz, supra note 4, at 812 (noting that "the court
distinguished the contract at issue in Rogen by observing that there, the contract did not contain
a provision similar to an NRC, and was formed amid a disparity of bargaining power that al-
lowed the purchaser to be 'duped' into forfeiting his rights") (citing Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at
344).
'32See Memorandum from Tashlik Kreutzer, Goldwyn & Crandell P.C., supra note 128;
Betzen & Meamber, supra note 105, at 10.
133Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 344.
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2. Subsequent Litigation: The Aftermath of Harsco Corp. v. Segui
In Rissman v. Rissman,t34 the Seventh Circuit followed Harsco
Corp., holding that an NRC in a stock-purchase agreement "precludes
any claim of deceit by prior representations.' 35 In Rissman, the
plaintiff sold his interest in a corporation to his brother, the defendant,
who already owned two-thirds of the corporation. The purchase
agreement contained clauses providing that the parties did not rely on
any oral statements. After the defendant later sold the corporation, the
plaintiff still sued, claiming he relied on defendant's oral statements
that he would never sell the corporation. 136 In holding the NRC
valid, 137 the court stated, "[t]he principle is functionally the same as a
doctrine long accepted in this circuit: that a person who has received
written disclosure of the truth may not claim to rely on contrary oral
falsehoods."'
' 38
3. NRC Invalid: Third Circuit: AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co.
After Harsco Corp. and Rissman, the question concerning the ef-
fect of NRCs in federal securities fraud actions seemed settled.1 39 A
majority of federal circuit courts weighing in on the issue had held
that NRCs should bar Rule 1Ob-5 claims based on alleged extra-
contractual representations. 140 The Third Circuit, however, in AES
Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., later ruled that an NRC in a stock pur-
chase agreement cannot bar a purchaser's Rule lOb-5 claim.'
4
'
Defendant Dow Chemical Company (Dow) solicited buyers for its
subsidiary Destec Energy, Inc (Destec). 142 Prior to solicitation, Dow
hired Morgan Stanley to perform a valuation of Destec. AES Corpo-
1-213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2000).
135 Id. at 384.
'1 Id. at 382.
137 The court, however, failed to mention section 29(a), which is crucial to the proper de-
termination of NRCs.
138Rissman, 213 F.3d at 384 (citing Cart v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1996);
Assocs. in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 941 F.2d 561, 571 (7th Cir.
1991)).
139 Lutz, supra note 4, at 814.
140 See Rissman, 213 F.3d at 383 (holding an NRC valid but failing to mention or interpret
section 29(a)); Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding an NRC valid upon
analysis of section 29(a)); Jackvony v. RIHT Financial Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989)
(diverging from the reasoning of Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966), but not
overruling Rogen); One-O-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (holding "silence in a final agreement containing an integration clause-in the face of
prior explicit representations-must be deemed an abandonment or excision of those earlier
representations"; however, the court failed to mention or interpret section 29(a)).
141 AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Memorandum
from Tashlik, Kreutzer, Goldwyn & Crandell P.C., supra note 128.
142 Destec Energy, Inc. has since changed its name to Dynegy Power Corporation.
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ration sought to acquire Destec's international operations, which it
operated through a subsidiary named Destec Engineering, Inc.
(DEI).143 DEI possessed one asset: a "contract to design and construct
a power plant in the Netherlands." 144
AES purchased certain assets of Destec, including all of DEI's
capital stock. Following the acquisition, AES brought a Rule 1Ob-5
suit against Dow and Destec for securities fraud in connection with
the sale of DEI to AES. AES claimed that Dow misrepresented the
predicted completion date of the Dutch power plant and its potential
profit. AES claimed that because of these material misrepresentations,
DEI incurred a $70 million loss instead of $31 million profit. 45
In order to receive a confidential offering memorandum on behalf
of Destec, AES signed a confidentiality agreement with Destec's fi-
nancial advisor. In this agreement AES acknowledged that "neither
[Destec], nor Morgan Stanley [Destec's Investment Banker] or its
affiliates, nor [Destec's] other Representatives, nor any of [Destec's]
or [Morgan Stanley's] respective officers, directors, employees,
agents or controlling persons ... make any express or implied repre-
sentation or warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of the In-
formation."'146 AES agreed that "no such person will have any liability
relating to the Information or for any errors therein or omissions
therefrom," and that it is "not entitled to rely on the accuracy or com-
pleteness of the Information and that [AES] will be entitled to rely
solely on any representations and warranties as may be made to [it] in
any definitive agreement with respect to the Transaction."' ' 47
The offering memorandum contained the alleged misrepresenta-
tions. Like the confidentiality agreement, the offering memorandum
stated "[o]nly those particular representations and warranties which
may be made to a purchaser in a definitive agreement, when, as, and
if executed, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be
specified in such definitive agreement, shall have any legal effect."'' 41
Dow and Destec, however, gave information to AES and other poten-
tial bidders in several other ways, such as presentations; mailing
documents directly to potential bidders and making other documents
143 See Michael Coddington, Non-Reliance Clauses-They Are Not Get-Out-of-Jail-Free
Cards, FAEGRE & BENSON LLP, http://www.faegre.com/articles/articleprint.aspx?id=1 120 (last
visited Apr. 4, 2006) (summarizing AES Corp.).
14AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 175.
1451d. at 177.
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available at Destec's facilities in Houston, Texas; and distributing a
computer model to value Destec's assets.
149
AES was only interested in the international assets of Destec, but
Dow sought to sell all of Destec. As a result, AES and NGC Corpora-
tion submitted a joint bid for all of Destec. Dow accepted their offer
that broke the transaction into two steps. First, NGC purchased all of
the stock of Destec from Dow pursuant to a Merger Agreement by
and among Dow, Destec, and NGC. Second, AES purchased all of the
international assets of Destec, including all of DEI's capital stock,
from NGC pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement between AES
and NGC.
Both the Merger Agreement and the Asset Purchase Agreement
contained NRCs. Section 4.6 of the Merger Agreement provided,
"[e]xcept for the representations and warranties contained in this
Article IV, neither Dow nor any other person makes any other express
or implied representation or warranty on behalf of Dow."15 Article
IV of the Merger Agreement consisted of two pages of
representations and warranties, but contained no representation or
warranty about the Dutch plant. 15 Section 3.4 of the Asset Purchase
Agreement stated, "except for the representations and warranties
contained in this Article EIl, neither NGC nor any other person (as
defined in the Merger Agreement) makes any other express or
implied representation or warranty on behalf of NGC." '52 The
definitive Asset Purchase Agreement included over twenty single-
spaced pages of representations and warranties, but like the Merger
Agreement, it contained no representation or warranty with respect to
the Dutch plant.153 However, AES, during its due diligence
investigation, received information regarding DEI and the Dutch plant
through Destec's presentations, on-site visits, and review of certain
documents in a data room.
154
In addition to the NRC, the Merger Agreement included a standard
merger clause similar to the merger clause reviewed by the Second
Circuit in Harsco Corp. It provided that, "[tihis Agreement and the
Confidentiality Agreement, and certain other agreements executed by
the parties hereto as of the date of this Agreement, constitute the en-





153 The Subcommittee on Recent Judicial Developments, Annual Survey of Judicial Devel-
opments Pertaining to Mergers and Acquisitions, 59 BUS. LAW. 1521, 1522 (2004).
154Id.
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standings (written and oral), among the parties with respect to the
subject matter hereof."' 155
AES alleged "that Dow knew specific facts about" Destec and DEI
"that contradicted the representations [Dow] made prior to and during
[AES's] due diligence. 156 Furthermore, AES contended that Dow
was involved in a "scheme to defraud" AES by concealing the true
state of the Dutch plant and frustrating AES's due diligence efforts by
causing false and misleading information to be provided by Destec
and Destec employees.1
57
The Third Circuit held that "enforcement of the [NRCs] to bar
AES's fraud claims as a matter of law would be inconsistent with
Section 29(a).' 5 8 If a purchaser "commits itself never to claim that it
relied on representations of the other party to its contract, it purports
anticipatorily to waive any future claim based on the fraudulent mis-
representations of that party.' ' 159 The Third Circuit agreed with the
First Circuit's conclusion in Rogen that an NRC will not always pre-
clude Rule 1 Ob-5 fraud liability, even for a sophisticated buyer.
Both courts, however, indicated that NRCs might be either evi-
dence that a party did not rely on extra-contractual representations, or
evidence of the unreasonableness of the party's reliance. 160 Determin-
ing reasonableness involves a case-by-case analysis of all relevant
circumstances, including the use of an NRC, and applying the reason-
able reliance standard set forth in Straub. 161 The court acknowledged
that "a buyer in a non-reliance clause case will have to show more to
justify its reliance than would a buyer in the absence of such a con-
tractual provision,"' 162 especially in cases involving an NRC negoti-
ated between sophisticated parties. 63 The court, however, failed to
155 AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 177 (alteration in original) (quoting the Merger Agreement).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 178.
158 ld. at 180.
t
5 9 d. ("The same is true if the commitment is more limited, e.g., a promise not to claim
reliance on any representation not set forth in the agreement. The scope of the anticipatory
waiver is more limited, but it is nevertheless an anticipatory waiver of potential future claims
under Rule l0b-5.").16 0Betzen & Meamber, supra note 105, at 10.
161 See AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 181-82 (remanding to the district court for further discovery
regarding the reasonableness of AES's reliance); The Subcommittee on Recent Judicial
Developments, supra note 153, at 1523 (citing five non-exclusive factors set forth in Straub v.
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 1976), which courts have used to determine the
reasonableness of a party's reliance: "(i) whether a fiduciary duty existed between the parties;
(ii) whether the plaintiff had an opportunity to detect the fraud; (iii) the sophistication of the
plaintiff; (iv) the existence of a long-standing business or personal relationship; and (v) 'the
plaintiff's access to the relevant information').
162 AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 181.
163 See ida; The Subcommittee on Recent Judicial Developments, supra note 153, at 1523;
see also Coddington, supra note 143 (adding that "cases where sophisticated parties have nego-
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explain what would constitute enough evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption that any reliance would be unreasonable.
Consequently, even though the First and Third Circuits have taken
a more liberal approach, the use of an NRC may materially impair the
ability of a plaintiff to claim a Rule lOb-5 violation based upon repre-
sentations and warranties not contained in the final agreement.'
64
1H. DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF CORPORATE TRANSACTIONS
Aimed at investor protection, the 1934 Act recognizes the need for
public investment in the securities markets in order to increase em-
ployment, and encourage economic growth and capital formation.
65
Congress's concern is to protect investors and the integrity of and
public confidence in securities markets) 66 Congress seeks "to protect
investors from fraudulent practices in securities markets [and] en-
courage the rapid dissemination of financial information which may
have an impact on the value of a security.'
167
The Supreme Court in Hochfelder established that scienter is re-
quired for a Rule lOb-5 violation; 168 therefore, an NRC serves a pur-
pose only when the defendant makes a false statement with scienter.
Harsco Corp. and Rissman, however, do not permit claims based on
fraudulent inducement. 169 An NRC negates a purchaser's reliance,
thus destroying a necessary element for a fraud claim.' 70 The effect
tiated a contract with a non-reliance clause... will often be appropriate candidates for summary
judgment").164 Betzen & Meamber, supra note 105, at 10.
165 Catina & Schmitt, supra note 18, at 299.
166 See THE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, REGULATION OF SECURITIES, S. REP.
No. 73-47, at 1 (1933), reprinted in 1 FED. BAR ASs'N SEC. LAW COMM., FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 89 (1983) ("The purpose of this bill is to protect
the investing public."); see also supra Part I (discussing the purposes of the 1933 and 1934
Acts).167 Carlos J. Cuevas, The Misappropriation Theory and Rule lOb-5: Deadlock in the Su-
preme Court, 13 J. CORP. L. 793,797 (1988).
168See Kuehnle, supra note 73, at 145 ("The Hochfelder opinion decisively resolved two
issues for a Rule 10b-5 violation: negligence is not sufficient, and scienter is required."); Ernst
& Emst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (providing that "§ 10(b) was addressed to
practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negli-
gent conduct alone").
'69Harsco Corp. and Rissman are not the only two cases negating fraudulent inducement
claims. All cases allowing NRCs to bar reasonable allowance negate fraudulent inducement.
Fraudulent inducement, or "fraud in the inducement" is defined as:
Fraud occurring when a misrepresentation leads another to enter into a transaction
with a false impression of the risks, duties, or obligations involved; an intentional
misrepresentation of a material risk or duty reasonably relied on, thereby injuring the
other party without vitiating the contract itself, esp. about a fact relating to value.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 55, at 686.
170 Palmieri, supra note 41, at 148.
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"is not to exculpate one of fraud, but rather to negate the reliance
element of a fraud claim (and the result is said to be that, obviously,
without reliance, there is no fraud).' ' 171 An NRC would bar a claim
under Rule lOb-5 that a defendant induced a plaintiff to agree to the
NRC while knowing that there were materially false statements in
documents excluded under the NRC.
At first glance, this may seem contrary to congressional goals,
specifically investor protection. However, an acquisition of a business
is far different from a transaction on the New York Stock Exchange172
or NASDAQ. 173 In corporate transactions, the purchaser is not an
investor in the usual sense, but rather the purchaser of an entire busi-
ness. Unlike many public investors, the purchaser is typically a large,
sophisticated company advised by counsel.
In all acquisitions, purchasers recognize that they should know the
following information about the target's business:
(1)The financial history of the business, including its past
stability, growth, and diversity of operations;
(2) The profit and loss statements, balance sheets, and tax
returns;
(3) Tax and audit history;
(4) Contracts and other agreements;
(5) Credit history;
(6) Good will, including reputation or prestige of business and
ownership of trade or band names. 174
In stock transactions, the purchaser should also be aware of the corpo-
ration's history by thoroughly reviewing its articles of incorporation,
certificate of incorporation, by-laws, minute books, and registrations
171 Id. at 148 n.331.
172The New York Stock Exchange is "the world's leading and most technologically
advanced equities market . . . A broad spectrum of market participants, including listed
companies, individual investors, institutional investors and member firms, create the NYSE...
market." New York Stock Exchange, About the NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.htmi?
displayPage=/press/1 134733534152.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
173 The NASDAQ is "the largest U.S. electronic stock market. With approximately 3,300
companies, it lists more companies and, on average, trades more shares per day than any other
U.S. market." NASDAQ, FactSheet 2005, (2004), http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorporateFact
Sheet 2004.pdf.
174 Palmieri, supra note 41, at 193 (citing FRANK L. BRUNETrI & STANLEY J. YELLIN,
BusINEss ACQUISITIONS H 201.2(B)-(E), 201.4(A), (E) (1987)).
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to transact business. 175 Additionally, the purchaser will be subject to
all the target's liabilities, so it should know all the threatened and
outstanding litigation, debts, contracts, leases, insurance, licenses,
pension plans, and agreements.
176
Preliminary negotiations begin the courtship between parties in
corporate transactions and "[i]f a meeting of the minds occurs, the
parties are said to have reached an 'agreement in principle' on the
transaction.' 177 Once the parties reach an agreement in principle,
1 78
they begin intense investigations of each other's affairs, hoping to
negotiate a definitive merger agreement.
179
Parties to acquisitions "spend more time negotiating 'Representa-
tions and Warranties of the Seller' than any other single article in the
typical acquisition agreement.' 180 Purchasers view representations as:
useful as a device to obtain the maximum degree of
disclosure about the acquired business prior to the purchaser
undertaking a binding commitment to make the acquisition.
In other words, representations constitute a systematic
smoke-out of the data about the seller which the buyer feels is
important. . . .This focusing aspect of representations can
often alert the purchaser to questionable areas for more
detailed investigation, and may even provide ammunition for
use in renegotiating the price or other terms of the deal.'81
During due diligence, this information is sought out by the purchaser
or its attorneys and accountants. 82 This fact significantly lessens the
need for statutory protection. Corporate purchasers have the financial
ability and sophistication to investigate the target completely; this
demands Harsco Corp.'s application of section 29(a).
Section 29(a) provides a rule that parties must be able to rely on in
drafting acquisition agreements. 8 3 Section 29(a) is not violated "[a]s
long as the party is not seeking to 'opt out' of regulation, or binding
175 Id. at 193-94 (citing BRUNETrI & YELLIN, supra note 174, 1 201.2-201.2(B)).
176 Id. at 194 (citing BRUNErl & YELLIN, supra note 174, 203.1).
177 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 1014-15 (stating that the agreement in principle "re-
iterates the parties' mutual intent to merge at a stated (or formula) price, which is made ex-
pressly subject to the negotiation and execution of a definitive acquisition agreement," along
with their respective boards', creditors', and regulatory authorities' approval).
178 An agreement in principle can be oral or it can be in a writing known as a "letter of
intent."
1
79 GILsON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 1014.
180 JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 229 (1975).
181 Id. at 230.
182 Palmieri, supra note 41, at 193.
183 See Lutz, supra note 4, at 839 (describing the rule as one upon "which parties should be
able to rely").
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the other party to waive their rights under the Act."' 184 An NRC does
not waive compliance with the 1934 Act; it merely affects the ques-
tion of whether there is a Rule lOb-5 violation in the first place. One
cannot waive a right one does not have, and one does not have the
right to rely unreasonably and then expect compensation under Rule
lOb-5. Given the parties' level of sophistication, section 29(a) de-
mands strict application, forbidding only express waivers of the rights
afforded under the 1934 Act. This offers parties certainty in their con-
tractual agreements.
The 1934 Act "is regulation intended to supersede 'the philosophy
of caveat emptor,' whereas traditional contract law promotes bargain-
ing free of regulation."' 85 NRCs barring claims of reasonable reliance
offer parties specifically defined boundaries. This bar does not rein-
state the philosophy of caveat emptor. In these situations, purchasers
cannot bring Rule lOb-5 claims if the seller omits the alleged misrep-
resentation from the final agreement, but purchasers can still sue for
misrepresentations in the final agreement. This limitation compels
purchasers to make certain all significant representations are in-
cluded. 186 If not, purchasers can insist that they be included, or the
purchaser can refuse to sign the NRC. This result furthers the Su-
preme Court's desire to limit the potency of Rule lOb-5 and does not
revert to caveat emptor.
The Third Circuit in AES Corp. acknowledged that NRCs "reflect
the fact that the seller was unwilling to vouch for the accuracy of the
information it was providing and the fact that the buyer was willing to
undertake to verify the accuracy of that data for itself."1 87 The court
added that, "a buyer who relies on seller-provided information with-
out seeking to verify it has not acted reasonably .... For this reason,
cases involving a non-reliance clause in a negotiated contract between
sophisticated parties will often be appropriate candidates for resolu-
tion at the summary judgment stage." 188 In other words, a purchaser
cannot prove reasonable reliance when a negotiated contract contains
an NRC; the purchaser has no viable Rule lOb-5 action.' 89 Even after
'84 Id. at 839.
185 Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom of Contract: The Trojan Horse of Rule lOb-5, 51 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 879, 880 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Palmieri, supra note 41, at 119
("Although caveat emptor is still followed in execution sales, tax sales, and judicial sales, the
doctrine has been rejected in security sales .... ) (citations omitted).
186 Purchasers have the duty to make sure all significant representations are included in the
agreement before signing. This may create an incentive for sellers to keep certain representa-
tions out of the contract in hopes of an oversight by the purchaser, but this is not a realistic
concern considering the purchaser's level of sophistication.
187 AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2003).
188 Id.
189 Lutz, supra note 4, at 840.
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stating the proper effect of an NRC, the court was "unwilling ... to
hold that the extraction of a non-reliance clause, even from a sophisti-
cated buyer, will always provide immunity from Rule 1Ob-5 fraud
liability."'19 Instead, the court held that an NRC violates section 29(a)
and is invalid as a per se bar to a plaintiffs reasonable reliance
claim.19'
The AES Corp. court did not negate all effects of an NRC; rather,
it transformed the NRC into another factor in the already complex
balancing test.192 The court concluded that an NRC should count as a
factor concerning the reasonableness of reliance, but this, too, weak-
ens a plaintiffs ability to recover under Rule lOb-5.
By failing to give NRCs the proper effect, courts increase parties'
transaction costs in acquisitions. 193 Parties can no longer reduce their
negotiations to one final definitive agreement defining the boundaries.
Instead, every document and oral statement the purchaser receives or
reviews or allegedly receives, whether given to it by an authoritative
representative of the seller or not, can be a basis for a Rule 1Ob-5
claim. The Seventh Circuit stated in Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco,
Inc. 194 that:
[a] seller who fully discloses all material information in writ-
ing should be secure in the knowledge that it has done what
the law requires .... Otherwise even the most careful seller
is at risk, for it is easy to claim: "Despite what the written
documents say, one of your agents told me something else."
If such a claim or oral inconsistency were enough, sellers'
risk would be greatly enlarged. All buyers would have to pay
a risk premium to cover this extra cost of doing business.
195
This invites fraud and frivolous Rule lOb-5 litigation since a seller
cannot possibly know all information disclosed by its employees or
prove the non-existence of an alleged oral statement.
Courts must adopt the rule that an NRC establishes conclusive
proof of a sophisticated party's non-reliance on any representations or
warranties not contained in the final negotiated agreement. An NRC
efficiently defines the boundaries of the transaction and precludes
fraudulent Rule lOb-5 claims in corporate acquisitions.
190AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 181.
191 Id. at 180.
192Id. at 181.
193 Lutz, supra note 4, at 840.
'94 844 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1988).
95Id. at 1322.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court desires to limit the application and potency of
Rule lOb-5. NRCs offer sophisticated parties the ability to define the
boundaries of their transactions. The effect of an NRC seemed settled
until the Third Circuit decided AES Corp. A strict application-
forbidding only express waivers of the 1934 Act-is the best ap-
proach in the context of a corporate transaction. Given the parties'
level of sophistication, intensity of investigations, and emphasis on
negotiating representations and warranties, an NRC efficiently allo-
cates the risks and liabilities. After negotiations, if the purchaser is
still not satisfied with the agreement, it has the ability to renegotiate
or refuse to sign the agreement. An NRC effectively limits fraudulent
Rule lOb-5 claims in corporate transactions.
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